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Replacement Justice on the United States
Supreme Court: The Use of Temporary
Justices to Resolve the Recusal
Conundrum
By NOAH M. SCHUBERT*
Introduction
CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHETICAL: the constitution-
ality of President Barack Obama’s signature health care initiative, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has been considered by
both the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. At issue is the constitutionality of the individual mandate, requir-
ing Americans to carry health insurance coverage. The Fourth Circuit
has upheld the mandate, while the Eleventh Circuit has invalidated it,
finding no congressional power to compel the purchase of a private
good under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has accepted
both cases and scheduled the issue for oral argument.1 However, Jus-
tice Elena Kagan, newly appointed to the Supreme Court by President
Obama, decides to recuse herself from hearing the case—out of an
* J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law, 2011. B.A., University of
California, Berkeley, 2003. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of my late uncle,
Eric Lamm. He was perhaps the first person to read the final printed copy of Volume 45,
Issue 1 of the USF Law Review cover-to-cover—simply because it bore my name on the
masthead—and he unconditionally supported everything I did. Eric had an encyclopedic
mind and a curiosity that knew no bounds, and he invariably put the needs of others
before his own. He would have been proud of this Comment, and I was proud of him. Eric
died due to complications from cancer on January 26, 2011.
1. The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently accepted multiple cases that address the
same or similar federal questions, consolidating them for oral argument. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (a Kansas case that was consolidated with Briggs v.
Elliott, 130 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952), Davis v. County Board of Education, 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va. 1952), and Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952)). If, however, the Court
were to only accept a health care case from one circuit, that would also be problematic.
Because no affirmative action can be taken on a 4-4 tie, the outcome of the case would
hinge on whether the Court accepted an appeal from a circuit where the mandate was
upheld or was struck down—a seemingly arbitrary distinction determining a major consti-
tutional issue.
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abundance of caution, given that she was involved in administration
policy during the contentious health care debate, and with a desire to
avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest. The eight remain-
ing Justices find themselves bitterly divided, with the traditional four
conservatives finding the law unconstitutional, and Justice Kennedy
siding with the three remaining liberals on the Court to uphold it.
The result is a 4-4 deadlock. As the country eagerly awaits a decision
on this hotly contested issue, the U.S. Supreme Court instead, per its
usual practice in such situations, issues a one-sentence per curiam
opinion: “The judgments are affirmed by an equally divided Court.”
Such an outcome could throw the country into disarray. Because
the U.S. Supreme Court can take no affirmative action on a tie vote,
both the lower court judgments upholding and invalidating the
health care law would be affirmed. The outcome would be a patch-
work of laws across the country, creating a situation in which Florida
residents would not be required to purchase health care while Vir-
ginia residents would face substantial federal fines if they did not.
Other states would be left to the whims of their federal circuits, and
the result would be that arguably the most significant federal law of
the past quarter-century would be constitutional in some states but
unconstitutional in others. Moreover, because the specific issue of a
federal mandate for health insurance coverage would be unlikely to
return to the Court again in a way in which Justice Kagan would not
be recused, the issue would unlikely be resolved anytime in the near
future. The Court and the country would be effectively paralyzed as to
one of the most important political issues of our time.
This is precisely the issue that this Comment will address. Al-
though the above hypothetical may seem improbable,2 the U.S. Su-
preme Court has faced real issues posed by the problem of recusal-
based tie votes, and the possibility of such a “nightmare scenario”
lurks in the background each time a Justice faces the difficult decision
of whether or not to recuse. This Comment will both trace the back-
ground of recusal-based tie votes and examine some of the proposed
solutions to avoid these issues in the future. Part I will examine the
history of and problems surrounding recusal-based tie votes. Part II
will consider how both the lower federal courts and the state supreme
2. As discussed infra Part III.A.1., the lack of any mechanism to replace a recused
Justice can have a significant impact on recusal decisions themselves. As Justice Scalia has
acknowledged, the fact that recusal may result in a 4-4 tie is a reason not to recuse oneself,
and Justice Kagan may very well heed that warning. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S.
913 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
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courts deal with this issue, with a particular focus on the federal desig-
nation statutes and the alternative approach of the California Su-
preme Court. Part III will analyze three specific proposals for
addressing this problem: the use of retired Supreme Court Justices,
chief judges of the circuit courts of appeals, and a pool of all circuit
judges as temporary replacements for recused Justices. Part IV will
consider the constitutionality of each of these proposals, evaluating
whether they are consistent with the One Supreme Court Clause, the
Appointments Clause, and the meaning of “judicial office” under Arti-
cle III.
While this Comment will acknowledge some specific policy and
constitutional obstacles to the use of temporary replacement Justices,
it ultimately argues that the need for certainty in the law is of para-
mount concern and that the use of designated Justices—most work-
ably from a pool of sitting circuit court judges—is both constitutional
and the most effective solution to this pressing issue.
I. The History and Problem of Recusal-Based Tie Votes
When the U.S. Supreme Court is short a Justice, the law does not
currently provide for any procedure to replace her. This leaves the
Court with an equal number of Justices and the very real potential of a
tie vote. That result has generally arisen from two possible scenarios:
the “long and indeterminate absence” of a Justice3 or a decision by
one of the Justices to recuse herself due to a real or apparent conflict
of interest.4 The first scenario manifests itself when a Justice takes
time away from the Court to tend to other policy or personal matters,
including health issues or when a vacancy is created due to retirement
or death, and the Senate has failed to confirm the President’s nomi-
nee. For example, Justice Robert Jackson took time away from the
Court to serve as Special Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial.5 More recently, Chief Justice William Rehnquist missed forty-
four oral arguments between being diagnosed with terminal thyroid
cancer and his death in 2005.6 The second and more common scena-
rio arises when a Justice, on her own accord, opts for recusal, fre-
3. William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: His-
tory, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 32 (1983).
4. See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 643, 646 (2002).
5. Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 32 n.11.
6. Elaine Cassel, Chief Justice Roberts’s Health, After His Recent Seizure: What We Know,
What We Don’t Know, and What We May Never Know, FINDLAW (Aug. 2, 2007), http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/cassel/20070802.html.
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quently necessary when a new Justice has worked on a case before she
joined the Court. For example, Justice Elena Kagan, who served as
U.S. Solicitor General before joining the Court, has recused herself
from approximately one-third of the Court’s cases during its most re-
cent term.7 Likewise, Justice Thurgood Marshall, who also served as
Solicitor General before joining the Court, recused himself in fifty-
seven percent of all cases decided in his first term.8
Of course, a recusal or vacancy does not necessarily result in a tie
vote since more than a third of Supreme Court cases are decided
unanimously, and many more are decided by more than one vote.9
Between 1925 and 1982, there were only 123 “equal divisions” that
resulted in a tie vote.10 Over that period, approximately seventy-five
percent of the ties were caused by a recusal or temporary absence,
while twenty-five percent were caused by a vacancy on the Court.11 Yet
even though the aggregate number of equal divisions over time may
be small, each tie has the potential to create significant problems.
First, the constitutionality or statutory interpretation of an entire regu-
latory regime can be left unresolved.12 This represents the precise situ-
ation posed in the opening hypothetical, where if the Court
deadlocks, there is no clear method to resolve the stalemate in the
near-term. Second, tie votes create geographic disparities, as laws are
enforced differently in the various circuits without any guidance from
the Court.13 Although to some extent, this will always be the case—
since the Supreme Court accepts a very limited number of cases—it is
more significant in this context because these are cases on which the
Court has already granted certiorari from its myriad petitions and thus
7. Tom Goldstein, An Update on Recusal, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2010, 9:36 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/10/an-update-on-recusal. As of October 2010, Justice
Kagan had recused herself from twenty-four of fifty-two cases (or about forty-six percent).
Goldstein estimates that she will recuse herself from twenty-eight of the approximately
eighty-five cases the Court decides during its 2010 term (or one-third). Id.
8. Id.
9. SCOTUSblog FINAL Stats OT09, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotus
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf.
10. Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 30. In a typical term, the Court will decide
“fewer than one case by a 4-4 vote as a result of a recusal.” Michael C. Dorf & Lisa T.
McElroy, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices
to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court 11 (Cornell Law Sch., Working Paper No. 11-07,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1767333; see also infra Part III.A.1 (discussing
how the Court’s relative lack of recusals may be due to the fact that some Justices may not
recuse because of the lack of a replacement mechanism).
11. Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 36 n.34.
12. See id. at 31–32.
13. See id.
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deemed appropriate and necessary for decision. Third, even if a tie in
an individual case does not upset an entire regulatory regime or result
in disparate adjudication of laws across circuits, it still may represent
such an important issue that the lack of a decision works injustice on
one or more of the parties.14
When the Court does divide equally, the settled practice is to sim-
ply affirm the lower court decision, frequently in a per curiam opin-
ion. This is based on the premise that “no affirmative action can be
had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to
the judgment to be rendered or order to be made.”15 Moreover, that
affirmation is generally not accorded any precedential weight since it
was not the result of a majority action. Justice Stephen Field noted
that while the judgment is binding on the parties, the Court’s rule
“prevents the decision from becoming an authority for other cases of
like character.”16 This rule was later referenced in the federal judicial
code,17 and while the rule is not expressly required by statute, Con-
gress’s presupposition of its existence demonstrates that they were
both aware of and endorsed it.18
Perhaps the most striking example of the rule in action is Beazley
v. Johnson—a case involving application of the death penalty to a mi-
nor.19 In Beazley, a seventeen-year-old boy stole a car and in the pro-
cess killed its driver, John Luttig, the father of U.S. circuit court Judge
J. Michael Luttig.20 The perpetrator, Napoleon Beazley, was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death; he appealed to the Fifth Circuit on
the grounds that the Eighth Amendment and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights prohibit the government from exe-
cuting a minor.21 After the Fifth Circuit denied his appeal, Beazley
applied for a stay of execution pending certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court.22 Justice Scalia, to whom the stay was directed, recused himself,
as did Justices Souter and Thomas—on the basis that they had a per-
sonal relationship with the victim’s son, Judge Luttig.23 That left the
14. See id. at 32.
15. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 646 (quoting Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107,
111 (1868)).
16. Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 34 (quoting Durant, 74 U.S. at 113).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006).
18. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 652.
19. Beazley v. Johnson, 533 U.S. 969 (2001) (mem.).
20. Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV.
735, 735, 736 n.11 (2003).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 736 n.11.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN106.txt unknown Seq: 6 21-OCT-11 11:06
220 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
Court with a bare quorum of only six Justices, who found themselves
deadlocked 3-3.24 Per longstanding practice, the Court affirmed the
Fifth Circuit’s decision and denied the stay of execution to Beazley on
a tie vote.25 The decision was roundly criticized on the ground that “a
tie shouldn’t go to the executioner.”26 After the Supreme Court’s fail-
ure to reach a decision, Beazley was executed by lethal injection on
May 28, 2002.27
II. Designation Practices of the Federal Courts and State
Supreme Courts
While the U.S. Supreme Court will not break ties, there are spe-
cific provisions in place in both the lower federal courts and in the
states to temporarily replace absent or recused judges. These laws
have not been shown to have had a measurable impact on the quality,
consistency, or legitimacy of judicial decisions and have proven to be
an effective method to address the problems created by periodic
recusals. This section will explore the availability and effectiveness of
these laws, both as applied to their specific jurisdictions and as a possi-
ble template for a new U.S. Supreme Court policy.
A. Federal Designation Statutes
From the inception of the lower federal courts—with the passage
of the Ewarts Act of 1891 which established the federal courts of ap-
peals—district judges have been authorized to “sit by designation” on
federal appellate courts.28 Originally adopted by the courts them-
selves, these rules were later codified in federal statute.29 Under 28
U.S.C. § 292, district judges may sit by designation on federal appel-
late courts, as well as other district courts, either in their own circuit
or in another circuit.30 Assignments made within a district judge’s own
circuit are made at the discretion of the chief judge of the circuit
whenever “the business of that court so requires;” assignments made
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 736 (quoting Raymond Bonner, Three Abstain as Supreme Court Declines to Halt
Texas Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 14, 2001, at A1).
27. Last Statement—Napoleon Beazley, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (June 24, 2008),
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/beazleynapoleonlast.htm.
28. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Exami-
nation of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 360 (1995).
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291–292, 294 (2006).
30. Id. § 292.
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in another circuit are made at the discretion of the Chief Justice of
the United States “upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by
the chief judge or circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need
arises.”31 Additionally, circuit judges may also serve by designation on
appellate courts outside of their circuit, as well as federal district
courts.32 Under 28 U.S.C. § 291, assignments of circuit judges to tem-
porarily sit in other circuits may be made by the Chief Justice of the
United States “upon request by the chief judge or circuit justice of
such circuit,” while assignments to district courts may be made by the
chief judge of the circuit or circuit justice whenever they are in the
public interest.33 However, these statutes are silent as to how a chief
judge or the Chief Justice should exercise these powers, leaving the
issue to the circuits to implement their own policies.34 As of a 1993
survey of the circuits (the most recent of its kind available), none had
a formal policy regarding designation assignments; instead the chief
judge simply assigned willing judges on an informal basis.35
In addition, federal judges who have retired from active service by
electing “senior status” frequently sit by designation on courts outside
of the court to which they were originally appointed. However, that
option was not available until 1919 when Congress created senior sta-
tus by statute.36 In fact, historically, federal judges received no retire-
ment benefits at all.37 That changed in 1869 with the passage of the
first judicial pension, designed to encourage judges with physical or
mental problems to step down from the bench.38 That option was
technically still referred to as resignation. In 1919, a second option
was created: retirement from “active service.”39 Judges became eligible
for either option when they had satisfied the “Rule of Eighty,” by
which the “sum of their age and years of service on the federal bench
reaches eighty.”40 If, after satisfying the Rule of Eighty, a judge elects
senior status, 28 U.S.C. § 371 allows the judge to reduce his workload
to as little as one-quarter of the work of an active judge while still
31. Id.
32. Id. § 291.
33. Id.
34. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 28, at 360.
35. See id. at 361.
36. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 453, 473 (2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 371.
37. Stras & Scott, supra note 36, at 473.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 460.
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maintaining his salary and benefits.41 Although senior judges have re-
tired from active service, they remain members of the Article III judi-
ciary and frequently serve temporarily on courts outside of their
district or circuit.42
However, the federal statutes do not apply equally to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. In fact, none of the retirement or designation statutes
applied to Supreme Court Justices when they were first enacted.43
Prior to 1937, the only option available to Supreme Court Justices was
resignation, which did not provide any concomitant pension.44 As a
result, Justices prior to that time typically remained on the Court until
they died in office. In fact, 49 of the first 103 Justices left the Court as
a result of their death.45 That changed in 1937, when as a result of a
showdown between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the conserva-
tive Supreme Court, Congress amended the retirement statutes to per-
mit Supreme Court Justices to retire from active service with their full
salary intact.46 That allowed retired Justices to also sit on other federal
courts by designation, but the legislation expressly barred them from
serving by designation on the U.S. Supreme Court.47 The change was
designed to encourage conservative Justices, who were invalidating
President Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda, to retire from the Court;
since allowing them to serve on that same court by designation would
have run counter to that goal, Congress expressly prohibited it.48 To-
day, under 28 U.S.C. § 294, retired Supreme Court Justices may be
temporarily designated and assigned to any circuit or district court at
the discretion of the Chief Justice of the United States.49 But § 294(d)
expressly provides that “no such designation or assignment shall be
made to the Supreme Court.”50
All told, the practice of judges sitting by designation has become
quite common. From 1994 to 2000, one study showed that nearly fif-
teen percent of all federal appellate panels were comprised of at least
41. Id. at 461; see also 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1) (2006).
42. See Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 18.
43. See id. at 5.
44. See id. at 4 n.10.
45. Id. at 4.
46. See Jess Bravin, Welcome Back, Souter (and O’Connor and Stevens), WSJ LAW BLOG
(Sept. 29, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/29/welcome-back-souter-
and-oconnor-and-stevens/; see also 28 U.S.C. § 371.
47. See Bravin, supra note 46.
48. See id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 294.
50. Id. § 294(d).
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one district judge sitting by designation.51 In 2005, another study
showed that district court judges sat by designation in twelve percent
of appellate decisions in which an opinion was written, senior circuit
judges sat by designation in twelve percent, and visiting circuit judges
sat by designation in one percent.52 In sum, approximately one-quar-
ter of all circuit panels included a judge who was temporarily sitting by
designation.53 In reviewing the decisions of appellate panels that in-
cluded a district judge sitting by designation between 1984 and 1992,
two researchers found that about eighteen percent of their opinions
were written by the visiting district judge, a percentage significantly
lower than the one-third that one would expect from random
chance.54 The study also showed that the designated judges only wrote
dissenting or concurring opinions in one-to-two percent of cases, as
compared to three percent among circuit judges.55 Overall, circuit
court panels with at least one district judge were reversed 18.3% of the
time, as compared to 17.9% for those that only included circuit
judges—a figure that implies little difference in the quality of the ulti-
mate decisions.56
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that the use
of district judges on appellate panels does impact quality, basing their
arguments on the differences between the judges appointed to each
level.57 In particular, they point to two distinctions: intellectual ability
and temperament.58 One difference between trial and appellate
judges is that, according to the American Bar Association, nominees
for appellate judgeships are expected to have “an especially high de-
gree of scholarship and academic talent.”59 Trial and appellate judges
may also differ in judicial temperament, with some judges expressing
their opposition to the use of district judges on appellate panels on
the “grounds that trial judges often found it difficult to ‘think like
51. Gary Young, Lost in the Shadows: District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on Circuit
Courts Seem Reluctant to Rule Independently, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 23, 2004.
52. David G. Knibb, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 33.5 (5th ed. 2007).
53. Id.
54. Young, supra note 51.
55. Saphire & Solimine, supra note 28, at 370.
56. Id. at 369.
57. See id. at 392.
58. See id. at 392–95.
59. Id. at 392–93 (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICI-
ARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 2 (1988)).
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appellate judges.’”60 The commentators argue that because the nomi-
nation and confirmation process is decidedly more rigorous for cir-
cuit court nominees, these judges are better suited to hearing the
appellate cases for which they were confirmed.61
Conversely, the fact that district court judges have experience
hearing trial cases might actually argue toward improving the quality
of appellate decisions.62 That unique perspective may provide useful
input in crafting rules of law that are easier to apply at the trial court
level—especially since district judges, when sitting, generally only re-
present one vote among the three judges on a panel. Moreover, since
Supreme Court Justices and circuit court judges perform largely the
same function—and retired Supreme Court Justices have held the ex-
act same position—these concerns may be less relevant when consid-
ering whether to expand the use of designated judges to the Supreme
Court. While the tools necessary for judging may differ markedly be-
tween trial and appellate judges, that distinction does not apply be-
tween circuit court judges and Supreme Court Justices. Each group
performs an appellate function, and the skills necessary for a circuit
court judge are likely very similar to those of a Supreme Court Justice.
That makes the highest Court an even better forum for the use of
temporary judges than the lower courts.
Other concerns focus on the collegiality of judges and the legiti-
macy of the panels’ decisions. Some argue that collegiality of appellate
court judges may create “better-written and more consistent deci-
sions.”63 They contend that pulling together judges from different ge-
ographic regions who do not typically work together disrupts the
collegiality of many circuit panels, especially when the judges are on
different “social and professional footing.”64 Yet, this critique fails to
consider that circuit court panels are already selected at random, and
that each case, even without district judges, may already feature a
group that has never worked together previously.
Others argue that the inclusion of a district court judge on an
appellate panel gives the panel less legitimacy and carries “less author-
ity in the eyes of litigants, their attorneys, and affected members of the
60. Id. at 396 (quoting J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 137
n.g (1981)).
61. See id. at 392.
62. See id. at 377.
63. Id. at 372.
64. Id. at 376.
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public.”65 However, the decisions of panels that include a district
judge and those that do not both render judgments that are binding
on the parties, and their holdings are binding precedent entitled to
the same weight by lower court judges. Moreover, district court judges
are no less impartial or respected than circuit court judges, as each
judge has completed the same constitutionally mandated process
under Article III for nomination and confirmation.66 Each judge,
under Senate rules and custom, has answered questions before the
Judiciary Committee, answered an extensive questionnaire, provided
copies of every document they ever wrote and speech they ever deliv-
ered, and undergone a comprehensive FBI background check.67 After
confirmation, both district court and circuit court judges enjoy the
same protections from Article III, including lifetime appointment and
guaranteed compensation.68 Simply put, there is no reason to believe
that the decisions of a district court judge sitting by designation
should be any less valid or legitimate than those made by circuit court
judges.
Thus, the use of judges sitting by designation on other courts,
which has been engrained as a routine practice to deal with over-
crowded courts, has not been shown to have a measurable impact on
the quality, consistency, or legitimacy of federal court decisions.
B. State Supreme Courts
While the U.S. Supreme Court is barred by statute from assigning
temporary Justices, state supreme courts throughout the nation fre-
quently use some kind of designation system to replace recused jus-
tices or fill-in when there are judicial vacancies. According to one
survey, forty-five of the fifty states have a process that allows lower
court judges to be designated and assigned in at least some state su-
preme court cases.69 These processes vary greatly, from neutral, minis-
terial systems where a clerk selects the justice or a name is drawn from
a glass jar—the actual process used in the State of Washington—to
highly discretionary and more political systems, where the chief justice
65. Id. at 377.
66. Judicial Nominations and Confirmations, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http:/
/judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/judicial.cfm (last visited July 7, 2011).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Stephen R. Barnett & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Assignment of Temporary Justices in
the California Supreme Court, 17 PAC. L.J. 1045 app. (1986).
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selects the replacement himself.70 Specifically, twenty-two states allow
the chief justice to assign temporary replacement justices, eleven
states give that power to a majority of the remaining justices on the
court, eight states provide for the governor to make temporary ap-
pointments, and four states use some form of hybrid system.71
One example of a purely discretionary state system is that of Cali-
fornia. Since 1927, the California Constitution has allowed the chief
justice of the state supreme court to appoint temporary justices to that
court in the case of disqualification, absence, or an unfilled seat.72
That power has been used rather frequently. In fact, between 1954
and 1984, there were seventy-three cases in which a temporary justice
cast the deciding vote,73 and between 1977 and 2003, there were 408
cases that included a lower court judge sitting by assignment.74 Many
of those decisions were hotly contested, settling issues such as whether
a bystander can recover for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress,75 whether a law criminalizing abortion violated the state consti-
tution,76 whether the University of California’s affirmative action
policy was constitutional,77 and whether a legislative reapportionment
plan could be used in the state’s elections.78 In each of these cases, it
was a temporary replacement justice who cast the deciding vote.79
Historically, California Supreme Court chief justices have had “al-
most total discretion” in deciding both on a process for filling these
vacancies and in selecting the actual judges.80 That, in turn, has
prompted criticism that the process has been manipulated to favor
replacements that will vote with the chief justice.81 One prominent
example is Assembly v. Deukmejian, the 1980 reapportionment case
mentioned supra, where Chief Justice Rose Bird used her powers to
select a temporary replacement justice who voted with her to uphold a
70. See James C. Brent, Stacking the Deck? An Empirical Analysis of Agreement Rates Between
Pro Tempore Justices and Chief Justices of California, 1977–2003, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 14, 14 (2006).
71. Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at app. For example, in some states, the gover-
nor is allowed to name a temporary replacement justice, who must then be confirmed by a
majority of state supreme court justices. Id.
72. Id. at 1045; see CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
73. Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at 1049.
74. Brent, supra note 70, at 21.
75. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
76. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
77. DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1981).
78. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939 (Cal. 1982).
79. Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at 1050–52.
80. Id. at 1047.
81. See id.
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Democratic redistricting plan passed by the state legislature.82 The
vote was 4-3, and conservatives immediately objected that the process
was biased.83 They argued that because temporary replacement jus-
tices are specifically selected for a single case, the process is ripe for
abuse by the chief justice.84 Evidencing this, one study found “substan-
tial evidence of vote bias” in the selection of replacement justices by
California Supreme Court chief justices.85 Chief Justices Phil Gibson
(1940–64), Roger Traynor (1964–70), and Donald Wright (1970–77)
each assigned replacement justices who were over twenty percent
more likely to agree with them then the other members of the court
in swing cases (cases where the temporary justice cast the deciding
vote).86 Chief Justice Bird’s assignments were a tale of two halves.
Prior to April 1981, Chief Justice Bird assigned temporary justices to
sit for an entire calendar, which could sometimes result in one justice
hearing as many as eighteen cases.87 During that period, the lucky few
judges to be selected for that role were forty-nine percent more likely
to agree with her than the other justices in swing cases.88 When she
changed the policy later that year, limiting assignments to no more
than a single calendar day, the bias disappeared.89 From April
1981–1984, Chief Justice Bird’s designees were only four percent
more likely to support her position than the rest of the court in swing
cases, a decidedly different result.90 The differences can be seen when
reviewing all cases before and after April 1981 as well. While Chief
Justice Bird’s designees agreed with her 15.8% more under the old
policy, that difference dropped to 4.5% when she implemented self-
imposed limits.91
Even that bias virtually disappeared under Bird’s successors,
Chief Justices Malcolm Lucas (1987–1996) and Ronald George
(1996–2011). Chief Justice Lucas scrapped the discretional policy of
82. Assembly, 639 P.2d at 939.
83. See Brent, supra note 70, at 15.
84. See id. at 16–17.
85. Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at 1155.
86. Id. at 1142. Professors Barnett and Rubinfeld compared the agreement rates be-
tween the chief justice and temporary replacement justices each chief justice appointed (in
cases in which a replacement was used) with the agreement rates between the chief justice
and the associate justices on the court (in cases in which a replacement was not used). The
advantage described here is the percentage difference between the agreement rates of
these two groups. Id.
87. See id. at 1114.
88. Id. at 1142.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Brent, supra note 70, at 22.
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previous justices, instead designating replacement justices through an
alphabetical rotation system conducted by the court clerk.92 Chief Jus-
tice George continued Malcolm’s rotational system and also ended
the practice of designating trial court judges, limiting his assignments
to appeals court presiding judges with at least one year of prior experi-
ence.93 The result was that Chief Justice Lucas’s designees only agreed
with him 3.5% more than the associate justices, and Chief Justice
George’s designees actually agreed with him 0.3% less than the rest of
the court.94 In cases decided by a 4-3 vote, while Chief Justice Bird had
seen a 62.9% agreement-rate advantage between her temporary jus-
tices and the associate justices (prior to April 1981), that advantage
dropped to only 9.1% under the Lucas and George reforms.95 While
there still may be some lingering bias (since even randomly-selected
replacements may tend to defer to the chief justice),96 the rotational
system has dramatically limited its effect.
That leaves the issue of legitimacy. Since temporary replacement
justices are by their very name temporary, a decision in which a desig-
nee participates may not represent the opinion of the permanent
members of the court.97 Perhaps that is why, even though temporary
justices have participated in many 4-3 decisions where they were the
deciding vote, a temporary justice is also less likely to author major-
ity—or even concurring or dissenting—opinions. In a thirty-year study
from 1954–1984, temporary justices wrote majority opinions in only
four percent of their cases, as compared to thirteen percent among
permanent justices.98 Likewise, temporary justices wrote concurring
or dissenting opinions in eight percent of their cases, as compared to
sixteen percent among permanent justices.99 Yet regardless of who is
writing the opinions, the decisions have the same force of law, irre-
spective of whether a temporary justice cast the deciding vote. While
some may contend that a decision in which a temporary justice cast
the deciding vote has less legitimacy, by law it carries the same binding
force on all state courts as any other decision.100 Some of the state’s
most contentious issues—from abortion to affirmative action—have
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. at 24.
96. See Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at 1164.
97. See id. at 1169.
98. Id. at 1164.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1170.
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been decided by temporary justices, and yet we do not today discuss
these holdings with any less weight. If temporary justices had not been
used, these cases would have instead resulted in tie votes, creating no
binding precedent or uniform rules—and surely far less legitimacy
than the alternative. California’s history with temporary justices has
shown that the key to ensuring legitimacy is eliminating bias, not
abandoning the system of replacement altogether.
III. The Use of Temporary Replacement Justices in the U.S.
Supreme Court
While the use of temporary replacements in the lower federal
courts and state supreme courts has proven to be a workable solution,
there remain unique issues when using such a system in the court of
last resort. This section will address these unique policy issues and
evaluate three specific proposals for how to implement the designa-
tion of temporary Justices in the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. The Policy Rationale
Each of the specific proposals discussed infra is premised on the
idea that rendering a final decision on a case the Court has accepted
is preferable to affirmance by an equally divided Court, which carries
with it no precedential value. Establishing a policy to temporarily re-
place recused Supreme Court Justices would likely have significant ef-
fects in three principal areas: how frequently and in what
circumstances the Court’s members recuse themselves; the certainty
of the rule of law and the consistency it provides to the lower courts;
and the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions as viewed by judges, liti-
gants, and the public.
1. Evaluating the Impact on Recusal
While critics of a Supreme Court designation policy frequently
cite the low rate of recusal on the Court as reason for not needing
such a change,101 the better question is how the lack of a designation
policy affects the Justices’ individual decisions on recusal. Admittedly,
it is true that the Court only split 5-4 in sixteen of its seventy-two cases
during the 2009 term and that even in an unusual term (such as the
2010 term where Justice Kagan recused herself in a third of the cases),
101. See Amanda Frost, Academic Round-up, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 11:55 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/academic-round-up-65/.
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the Court is unlikely to deadlock 4-4 in more than a few decisions.102
But lurking beneath the surface lies the question of whether recusals
would be far more frequent if Justices could rely on a replacement to
prevent tie votes.
Indeed, the Court’s relative lack of recusals is by no means a de-
finitive statement that its members are free from conflicts of interest.
In a recent New York Times editorial, the newspaper lambasted the
Supreme Court’s failure to follow a comprehensible recusal policy.103
It noted, for example, that the Court in its previous term considered
an important gender-bias case against Wal-Mart, while at the same
time Justice Antonin Scalia’s son was the co-chairman of the labor and
employment practice at the law firm representing Wal-Mart.104 Yet,
Justice Scalia refused to recuse himself.105 At the same time, Justice
Clarence Thomas has received lavish gifts from litigants before the
Court, including a $15,000 bust of Abraham Lincoln given by the con-
servative American Enterprise Institute, who frequently files amicus
briefs.106 Yet Justice Thomas has steadfastly refused to recuse himself
in such cases.107 While it is outside the scope of this Comment to eval-
uate the Supreme Court’s recusal practices, it is important to under-
stand that recusal decisions are left entirely to individual Justices,108
who are not required to follow the Code of Conduct for U.S.
Judges.109 There is “no review mechanism, no opinion or public rea-
soning required, no legal accountability, and no mechanism to handle
replacement when recusal occurs.”110 Simply put, the lack of frequent
recusals does not equal the lack of a problem.
102. Id.
103. Editorial, The Court’s Recusal Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at A30, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/opinion/16wed3.html.
104. Id.
105. Id. Justice Scalia ultimately wrote the majority opinion to overturn the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s certification of a class action against Wal-Mart, thereby absolving the company his
son’s firm represented from liability—but only further implicating his own impartiality.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
106. Ian Millhiser, The Clarence Thomas Scandal, THINK PROGRESS (June 22, 2011 4:30
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/progress-report/the-clarence-thomas-scandal/.
107. Id.
108. See Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural
Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 109 (2004).
109. Letter from More Than One Hundred Law Professors to Senator Patrick Leahy,
Senator Charles Grassley, Representative Lamar Smith, and Representative John Conyers,
Jr. (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (call-
ing for mandatory ethical and recusal rules for Supreme Court Justices).
110. Roberts, supra note 108, at 109.
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One compelling reason that Justices may decline to recuse more
frequently is the lack of any designation policy to avoid an evenly-di-
vided Court. In the Supreme Court’s 1993 Statement on Recusal Pol-
icy, signed by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg, the Justices observe that “where the absence
of one Justice cannot be made up by another, needless recusal de-
prives litigants of the nine Justices to which they are entitled, pro-
duces the possibility of an even division on the merits of the case, and
has a distorting effect upon the certiorari process.”111 Similarly, in Che-
ney v. U.S. District Court, Justice Scalia rejected Sierra Club’s request
that he recuse himself after engaging in a duck-hunting excursion
with Vice President Richard Cheney prior to oral argument.112 In a
memorandum explaining his decision, Justice Scalia concluded:
Let me respond, at the outset, to Sierra Club’s suggestion that I
should “resolve any doubts in favor of recusal.” That might be
sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of Appeals. There, my
place would be taken by another judge, and the case would pro-
ceed normally. On the Supreme Court, however, the consequence
is different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the pos-
sibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to re-
solve the significant legal issue presented by the case.113
That same year, Justice Ginsberg echoed Scalia’s sentiment, observing
the same effect of recusal and noting that “[b]ecause there’s no sub-
stitute for a Supreme Court Justice, it is important that we not lightly
recuse ourselves.”114 Moreover, without any designation process, the
Court’s current recusal policy may simply encourage litigants to file
recusal motions purely predicated on an “unfavorable outcome from
a particular Justice on the merits.”115
The addition of a designation process, by which temporary re-
placement Justices could substitute for recused Justices, would obviate
this problem. Since whatever process the Court used to select a re-
placement would likely create uncertainty as to the replacement’s
111. Statement of Recusal Policy, from Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas,
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 1, 1993),
available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20110106_RecusalPolicy23.pdf. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito also adopted the 1993 recusal policy when they joined the Court.
See Tony Mauro, Justice Alito’s Green Day, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at 1; Lyle Denniston,
Roberts’ Recusal Policy, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 30, 2005, 4:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2005/09/roberts-recusal-policy.
112. Cheney v. United States, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
113. Id. at 915.
114. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36
CONN. L. REV 1033, 1038–39 (2004).
115. Roberts, supra note 108, at 180 n.360.
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vote, litigants would no longer be encouraged to file recusal motions
entirely designed to change the outcome.116 Indeed, Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-VT), whose proposal to use retired Supreme Court Justices
will be discussed infra Part III.B., said in remarks on the floor of the
U.S. Senate, “I hope that it will encourage Justices to recuse them-
selves when they have a financial conflict of interest or their participa-
tion would create the appearance of impropriety.”117 Indeed,
reforming the Supreme Court’s replacement process would go a long
way toward mending a broken recusal policy.
2. Certainty and Consistency in Law
The creation of a process for temporary replacements will also
create certainty in the rule of law and provide consistent guidance to
the lower courts. Of course, some critics contend that the Supreme
Court can “function perfectly well with eight Justices on a case,” since
the only formal effect of a 4-4 outcome is to let the lower court deci-
sion stand.118 They say that is simply not a problem since it is precisely
the same result that occurs in every other case—typically numbering
in the hundreds—in which the Court denies certiorari.119 Moreover,
even if a decision splits 4-4, that result does not foreclose the same
issue from being resolved in a subsequent case.120 Yet, this may be an
overly simplistic analysis. The cases that are under review are not just
any cases; they are cases on which the Court has made the affirmative
decision to select for argument and decision. Indeed, the very fact
that the Court has selected these specific cases—out of a pool of hun-
dreds—strongly suggests that the issues are sufficiently weighty or that
the lack of a Supreme Court decision might allow pernicious circuit
splits to persist.121
There are important reasons why—once a case has been deemed
worthy of a decision—it should be decided, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. First, many of the cases turn on significant constitutional
issues, which frequently have a critical impact on the basic functioning
of our government and the boundaries of our rights.122 Yet when
116. Id.
117. 156 CONG. REC. S7792 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
118. Jason Mazzone, 4-4 Is Fine, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2010/10/4-4-is-fine.html.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 10 n.40.
122. See Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 32.
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these critical lower court issues are left unreviewed by the Supreme
Court, Congress, the courts, and the people never receive a definitive
answer to some of the most important legal issues of our time.
Second, the lower court decisions on any given legal issue may
irreconcilably conflict, especially since the Supreme Court is generally
more likely to accept cases that involve a circuit split.123 When these
issues are left unresolved, those circuit splits persist, leaving one rule
of law in place in some parts of a country and another, often entirely
contrary rule in place in other parts—even in cases that involve the
exact same factual issue. As mentioned supra, the splits between cir-
cuits over President Obama’s health care reform law are a prime ex-
ample.124 Observing this real concern, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist described such stalemates as the courts laying down “one
rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome”—a problem our legal sys-
tem was structured to avoid.125 Yet, the lack of any mechanism to re-
place recused Justices only makes such scenarios more likely to occur.
3. Legitimacy of the Court’s Decisions
Finally, there is the issue of legitimacy. Supporters and critics of
instituting designation practices at the Supreme Court hotly dispute
whether it would increase or decrease the legitimacy of the Court’s
decisions in the eyes of the lower courts, the parties, and the public.
Critics assert that close cases decided by a Justice sitting by designation
could carry less authority than the Court’s other decisions.126 They
argue that since a recused Justice might later return to settle a sub-
stantially similar issue when not recused, the Court might be even less
likely to follow stare decisis, putting decisions that turned on a desig-
nated Justice on shaky ground.127 That, in turn, might disrupt the
continuity of the Court’s precedents and undermine the public’s con-
fidence in the institution.128 While there may be some truth to this
logic, one must also consider that Supreme Court cases are not de-
cided in a vacuum. The question is not simply whether designation
might impact legitimacy but rather whether designation would be
123. See id.
124. See supra Introduction.
125. 156 CONG. REC. S7793 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
126. Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 38.
127. Mike Dimino, Sitting by Designation on the Supreme Court, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Jan. 13, 2006, 10:44 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/01/sitting
_by_desi.html.
128. Reynolds & Young, supra note 3, at 38.
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more or less legitimate than affirmance of a lower court decision by
an equally-divided Court. On that point, Chief Justice Rehnquist ac-
knowledged that “decisions of important questions of statutory or con-
stitutional law by less than a full court are, other things being equal,
undesirable.”129 In a case where one of the Justices has elected
recusal, unique circumstances arise. Chief Justice Rehnquist was
acutely aware of the ramifications of recusal, noting that it “does not
simply substitute one full court for another; instead it removes one of
the component parts of the court, and the litigants have their case
decided by a partially truncated judicial tribunal.”130 That circum-
stance alone bodes ill for the legitimacy of the Court’s ultimate
decision.
Recusal without a replacement also creates practical problems
that may distort the way the final vote is tallied, further implicating the
Court’s legitimacy. Specifically, Justice Scalia observed that granting a
recusal motion has the same de facto result as casting a vote against
the petitioner in a given case.131 Justice Scalia, writing in his memo-
randum in Cheney, reasons that since the petitioner “needs five votes
to overturn the judgment below, and it makes no difference whether
the needed fifth vote is missing because it has been cast for the other
side, or because it has not been cast at all,” the current recusal system
is effectively no different than simply voting no.132 Thus, the current
incentives—which only encourage Justices to recuse when it would
not affect the ultimate decision—are already devoid of legitimacy.
The implementation of replacements would begin to rectify that prob-
lem, plugging the hole that is already apparent in the ship.
Finally, opponents also criticize the possibility that a temporary
replacement may not reflect the views of the Justice she replaces, cre-
ating a rule of law that the permanent Justices would not otherwise
support. Yet this view also seems to miss the mark. If a replacement
Justice were somehow guaranteed to vote identically to the Justice she
replaced—a situation far from likely as discussed infra—it would not
resolve the conflict of interest that precipitated the original Justice’s
recusal. Since any Justice considering recusal would have the confi-
dence to know that their replacement would follow their views, they
could simply rely on this fact to impute the conflict to the designated
129. Roberts, supra note 108, at 157 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense
About Judicial Ethics, 28 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 694, 707 (1973)).
130. Id. (emphasis omitted).
131. Cheney v. United States, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
132. Id. at 916.
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Justice. While it is true that a decision of a Court with a temporary
Justice may very well be different than one without, those decisions do
not carry any less binding authority on the parties or the Courts than
any other. Indeed, as the experience of state supreme courts has
shown, especially in California as discussed supra, controversial deci-
sions where designated Justices have cast deciding votes have not less-
ened the legitimacy of the courts.133 Even if we assume, arguendo, that
a designated Justice might provide the deciding vote for an erroneous
decision, it does not necessarily mean that the choice to use a system
of designation was the wrong choice. As Justice Louis Brandeis noted,
“It is usually more important that a rule of law be settled, than that it
settled right.”134 These proposals would resolve issues that could not
otherwise be resolved.
B. The Replacements: Evaluating Three Proposals for Temporary
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
Having established that the idea of allowing the U.S. Supreme
Court to use temporary replacement Justices merits serious considera-
tion, this Comment will now consider three possible implementations,
including one that has been proposed in Congress. The following pro-
posals include plans to use retired Supreme Court Justices, the chief
judges of the circuit courts of appeals, and a pool of all circuit courts
of appeals’ judges.
1. Retired Supreme Court Justices
The most widely discussed proposal was introduced by Senate Ju-
diciary Chair Patrick Leahy, who proposed that the Court allow re-
tired Supreme Court Justices—who already can serve on circuit and
district courts—to serve by designation on the U.S. Supreme Court.135
The genesis of the proposal came from retired Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, who suggested to Senator Leahy that he explore the idea.136 Jus-
tice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist had actually tried to implement the
idea on their own a few years prior, but according to Stevens, they
were simply “unable to persuade their colleagues to adopt the propo-
sal.”137 Under the Leahy proposal, a majority of the active Justices
133. See supra Part II.B.
134. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. S. 3871, 111th Cong. (2010).
136. 156 CONG. REC. S7792 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
137. Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 3 n.7.
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could vote to designate a retired Supreme Court Justice in a particular
case.138 It reads, in relevant part:
Any retired Chief Justice of the United States or any retired Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court may be designated and assigned
to serve as a justice on the Supreme Court of the United States in a
particular case if—
(A) any active justice is recused from that case; and
(B) a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that
retired Chief Justice or Associate Justice.
The bill, instead of mandating a designation practice, would simply
delegate that authority to a majority of the active Justices, just as the
current designation statutes delegate the authority to designate and
assign retired Supreme Court Justices to district and circuit courts to
the Chief Justice.
In principle, there are many benefits to using retired Supreme
Court Justices. Retired Justices have been described as a “valuable
human resource,” and while the group may be small, they can provide
valuable insight and skill to the Court on occasion.139 While most pro-
fessionals in other fields still make meaningful contributions at the
highest levels long after retirement, Supreme Court Justices are
barred from participating in any way on the Court to which they were
originally appointed.140 Yet, at the same time, from their work on dis-
trict and circuit courts across the country, we know that they are still
more than capable of serving.141 The three living, retired Supreme
Court Justices—O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens—have served collec-
tively for nearly eighty years, and by all accounts, each still retains his
or her sharp wit and skills.142 For instance, Justice O’Connor, even at
age eighty-one, has been actively involved in hearing cases since she
retired from active service.143 Justice O’Connor has decided almost
eighty cases and written over a dozen opinions since she left the Court
in 2006, and yet the talents of this formidable former Supreme Court
Justice seem wasted on “small potatoes.”144 For instance, in one
O’Connor opinion, she tackled the informidable question of whether
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 9.
140. See id.
141. See Michael C. Dorf, Some Possible Hidden Complications of a Senate Proposal to Permit
Retired Justices to Pinch-Hit for Their Recused Colleagues, FINDLAW (Oct. 6, 2010), http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/dorf/20101006.html.
142. See id.
143. See Jess Bravin, Change of Venue: In Retirement, Justice O’Connor Still Rules, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124994271588320
565.html.
144. See id.
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an animal control officer that was being sued for trespass had a duty
to check if a wolf—that was illegally registered as an Alaskan mala-
mute—was lawfully owned before seizing the animal.145 This is why
most Supreme Court Justices have passed on the opportunity to serve
in the lower courts after retirement.146 In the words of Justice Potter
Stewart, “[It’s] no fun to play in the minors after a career in the major
leagues.”147 The Leahy proposal would rectify that predicament and
put the substantial talents of retired Supreme Court Justices back to
use.
At the same time, it would also present many logistical problems,
given the small size of the pool of retired Justices and the difficulty in
deciding how to select a particular Justice. For starters, the pool of
retired Supreme Court Justices is likely to be unreliably sized and rela-
tively small.148 With a small number of living retired Justices available
to serve—especially if one or more has mental or physical health con-
cerns—there may not be enough Justices to handle the load in a term
with a significant number of recusals. The pool itself may also be
slanted toward a particular ideology, making it more or less likely that
particular Justices would be inclined to recuse.149 For instance, none
of the current retired Supreme Court Justices—O’Connor, Souter,
and Stevens—can be considered a true conservative. Were this propo-
sal in place for the current term and Justice Kagan was recused, the
conservative Justices would have no incentive to select a replacement.
With Justice Kagan off the Court, the worst they could do is reach a
tie, but with a replacement Justice, the conservatives might actually
end up on the losing end—since each of the current retired Supreme
Court Justices is considered more liberal than Justice Kennedy.150
Even if the Supreme Court could get past that question, there
remains the issue of how the Court would decide which retired Justice
to choose. Under the Leahy proposal, that choice would be left to the
remaining active Justices, who could deadlock 4-4, resulting in the
same problem that the proposal was designed to solve. Justice Harry
Blackmun, commenting on the possible unintended consequences of
the original Stevens-Rehnquist proposal asked, “Who shall select the
retired Justice? . . . Would the Chief Justice make the selection? If so,
145. See id. O’Connor began her opinion, “This is a case about a wolf named Dutch-
ess,” and she ultimately rejected the couple’s claim for trespass. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 176 n.345.
149. See id.
150. See Dorf, supra note 141.
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would those not selected have their noses out of joint? Or would he
follow the rule of seniority? Problems create problems . . . .”151 In
considering this question, it seems obvious that for this proposal to be
workable, the Court, on its own accord, would need to implement
some kind of rotational system or random lottery, borrowing from the
ideas of other state supreme courts (especially the California Supreme
Court, discussed supra Part II.B.). While a random lottery would re-
solve the problem of who to designate, even a random selection from
a limited—and potentially biased—pool would still pose significant
practical problems. For these reasons, it seems the Leahy proposal
may simply not be workable.
2. Chief Judges of the Circuit Courts
Another proposal, suggested by Professor Caprice Roberts at
West Virginia University College of Law, would be to use a pool com-
prised of each of the chief judges of the circuit courts of appeals.152
Currently, chief judges on each of the federal appeals courts are se-
lected by seniority. The most senior judge, who is sixty-four years old
or younger, has been a circuit judge for at least one year, and has not
served previously as chief judge is elevated to the position for a seven-
year term.153 However, under Roberts’s proposal, instead of basing se-
lection on seniority, Congress would alter this statutory scheme to al-
low the President to nominate—and the Senate to confirm—existing
circuit court judges for the position of chief judge.154 This would obvi-
ate any concerns that using existing chief judges might violate the Ap-
pointments Clause of the Constitution, since the scope of their prior
confirmations might not have included the possibility of being desig-
nated and assigned to serve temporarily on the U.S. Supreme
Court.155 When a recusal occurs, the Court would then select one of
these chief judges by random lottery, excluding the judge from the
circuit in which the case originated to prevent conflicts of interest and
limit any bias.156
This proposal would have some significant advantages, in that the
pool of chief judges would likely include judges of the “highest cali-
151. Roberts, supra note 108, at 180 (quoting Interview by Harold Hongju Koh with
retired Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Harry A. Blackmun Oral History Project, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Nov. 1, 1995)).
152. See id. at 176.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
154. Roberts, supra note 108, at 177.
155. See id. at 178; see also infra Part IV.B.
156. See infra Part IV.B.
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ber” in intellect, experience, and skills on the federal bench.157 Since
the judges would be handpicked by the President and closely scruti-
nized by the Senate, the nomination and confirmation process would
likely meet a much higher standard than an ordinary circuit court
judge—perhaps more akin to the process for Supreme Court nomina-
tions. In essence, the proposal would create a “shadow court” com-
prised of the next-best options to sitting Supreme Court Justices, who
could replace them when necessary and possibly even be groomed for
a lifetime appointment when a permanent vacancy occurs.
However, it would also present several logistical and substantive
problems. First, since the new chief judges would require nomination
and confirmation, that process would need to be staggered over a
number of years or presidential administrations to prevent one politi-
cal party from appointing the entire pool.158 The President could ei-
ther use the new process to appoint replacements when chief judge
vacancies arise—although that would create inconsistency among the
circuits and require a delay of the implementation date—or the law
could be written to provide a set number of appointments to succes-
sive presidents. Either method would create logistical issues and delay
the practical effective date of the plan by perhaps ten to fifteen years,
neither of which would be desirable. Second, the expansive adminis-
trative duties of a chief judge might not be consistent with the type
and caliber of judges appointed to these positions. Chief judges
groomed to temporarily—and perhaps even permanently—replace
Supreme Court Justices would presumably be best used deciding a sig-
nificant docket of cases, yet these judges may instead become
overburdened in administrative bureaucracy—a task ill-suited to their
skill set. Third, and most importantly, making chief judges subject to
nomination and confirmation could result in the politicization of the
post.159 Since Justices would be forced to jockey for these enviable
positions, it might affect their lower court decision making. Instead of
deciding cases purely on the merits—free from political considera-
tions due to their lifetime tenure—appellate judges may instead try to
tailor their decisions to meet the political whims of the President or
Congress, ensuring their consideration for a coveted chief judge spot.
Moreover, the process itself may turn decidedly political, creating thir-
teen more prime judicial positions on which to fight partisan battles,
stage theater-style confirmation hearings, filibuster, and exploit for
157. See id.
158. See id. at 177.
159. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 177.
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party fundraising. Therefore, while Roberts’s proposal definitely does
have its appeal, the practical problems of nominating and confirming
thirteen new chief judges may simply be insurmountable.
3. All Circuit Courts of Appeals Judges
The last—and perhaps most workable—proposal has been sug-
gested by Howard Bashman, author of the popular legal blog, How
Appealing.160 His proposal is simply to use the pool of all nonrecused
federal circuit judges in regular active duty.161 Assignment would be
made by random lottery, and if a case reaches the Court from a fed-
eral appellate court—as opposed to a state supreme court—the pro-
posal would also exclude all federal appellate judges from the circuit
in which it arose.162 This policy would prevent the possibility that a
designated judge might “be influenced by a desire to improve his or
her circuit’s affirmance rate” and ensure that the judge selected had
not had any earlier involvement in the case.163 In addition, the propo-
sal would be strictly limited to recusals or “other temporary unavaila-
bility” and exclude formal vacancies, since providing a method for
filling a vacancy by designation might encourage the Senate to delay
confirming a permanent replacement.164
Of the three options, this proposal is the simplest and easiest to
implement. Unlike the use of retired Supreme Court Justices or newly-
minted chief judges, which both create unnecessary complications
and comprise relatively limited pools, the use of all active circuit court
judges would provide the Supreme Court with a pool of over a hun-
dred judges from which to draw. These judges, having already been
confirmed by the Senate for the second-most important judicial posi-
tions in the country, are likely to be highly skilled, intellectually capa-
ble individuals ready to contribute to the nation’s highest court. This
proposal also most closely matches the successful systems already in
place at the state level, especially the California model discussed supra.
Critics might complain that a pool comprised of all circuit judges
might include a greater number of judges who hold rigidly ideological
or extreme views or who have developed a reputation on the appellate
160. See Howard J. Bashman, HOW APPEALING, http://howappealing.law.com/ (last vis-
ited May 18, 2011).
161. See Howard J. Bashman, Avoiding Recusal-Based Tie Votes at the U.S. Supreme Court,
LAW.COM (Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1204544938947&slreturn
=1&hbxlogin=1.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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courts for not strictly following the law. While it is true that a pool of
over one hundred judges is more likely to produce a few bad apples
than a pool of chief judges groomed for the jobs or retired Supreme
Court Justices who have already done them, such diversity of views and
legal philosophies might actually prove useful to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Instead of remaining cloistered in their well-appointed cham-
bers, hermetically sealed from the rest of the judicial system, the peri-
odic designation of appellate judges to sit alongside the permanent
Justices might spur dialogue, create debate, and result in better deci-
sion making. For these reasons, the proposal to use circuit judges—
simplest among the options reviewed—may present the most straight-
forward and workable solution to solving the Supreme Court’s recusal
albatross. The only remaining question is whether it is constitutional.
IV. Constitutionality of Temporary Replacement Justices on
the U.S. Supreme Court
In considering whether Congress can provide for the designation
and assignment of temporary replacement Justices on the U.S. Su-
preme Court, there is one broad, overriding concern, as well as spe-
cific objections to the types of Justices used: circuit court judges and
retired Supreme Court Justices. First, this Comment will analyze
whether statutory designation policies run afoul of the Constitution’s
One Supreme Court Clause. Second, it will discuss whether proposals
to use a pool of circuit judges or even appeals court chief judges im-
pinges on the President’s powers in the Appointments Clause. Finally,
it will consider whether the use of retired Supreme Court Justices, ei-
ther as its own proposal or as part of a larger pool, conflicts with the
meaning of “judicial office” embedded in Article III.
A. One Supreme Court Clause
The U.S. Constitution vests judicial power in “one Supreme
Court”—a fundamental, overarching requirement that must be satis-
fied irrespective of the particular proposal. Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution clearly states, “The judicial power of the United States,
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”165 Critics
make one basic objection to all designation proposals: since they
would create a Supreme Court with “fluctuating membership,” there
would not actually be “one Supreme Court” but multiple courts as the
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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membership changes.166 While no court has ever authoritatively deter-
mined the meaning of the One Supreme Court Clause, there are two
possible interpretations: one based on its plain meaning and the other
based on a more formalistic, original interpretation.
First, a plain reading of the One Supreme Court clause may sim-
ply require that while Congress may create lower federal courts, it can-
not create any additional supreme courts.167 Yet even by this standard,
some have argued that the Constitution would still allow the Supreme
Court to be split into panels.168 For instance, courts that “regularly
sit[ ] in panels—like the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit—can be understood as ‘one’ court.”169 The authors here
analogize to professional sports teams, noting that in common usage,
teams are generally thought of as a collective unit, even though their
individual membership will vary in terms of who is active on the field
at any given moment.170 Moreover, the Supreme Court has a long his-
tory of single-Justice decisions—especially in the case of Supreme
Court Justices exercising their powers as circuit justices—and has
never once considered that this practice might violate the One Su-
preme Court Clause.171 Therefore, under this interpretation, because
there is no clear prohibition in constitutional text or history, a propo-
sal to use recused Justices would be presumptively constitutional.
Second, under a more formal, originalist view of the Constitu-
tion, one might argue that the One Supreme Court Clause includes
an indivisibility requirement.172 In this context, indivisibility would
mean “one body of people that cannot be altered on its fixed
court.”173 Some scholars have argued that this interpretation can be
justified by the fact that “participants in the debates at the Philadel-
phia Convention assumed that ‘one Supreme Court’ meant one indi-
visible Supreme Court.”174 However, the evidence for this
interpretation is shaky at best, and even the authors that promote it
acknowledge that the issue was never discussed during the public de-
166. Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 20.
167. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 178.
168. See Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 20–21.
169. Id. at 21.
170. See id. at 21 n.102.
171. See id. at 21. In addition, during the period of 1802–1839, a single Justice was
“empowered to act (on many matters) in place of the entire Supreme Court during an
‘August Term.’” Id.
172. See id.
173. Roberts, supra note 108, at 178.
174. Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
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bate regarding ratification.175 Yet even if one accepts, arguendo, that
“one Supreme Court” really means “one indivisible Supreme Court,”
there are still logical reasons why substituting replacement Justices in
individual cases would not run afoul of that requirement. For starters,
the number of Justices on the Court—of which the maximum is cur-
rently set by statute—changes whenever a vacancy occurs.176 It
changes when Congress decides to amend the composition of the
Court—something it has done previously.177 And it changes when a
Justice recuses herself, temporarily creating a Court with one fewer
member. But of course, none of these changes has ever been held to
render the Court a divisible body or violate the One Supreme Court
Clause.178
Finally, even if a formalistic reading of the One Supreme Court
Clause did conclude that designation proposals conflicted with this
provision, there is an equally formalistic solution that could save such
a statute. Since Congress retains the power to make exceptions to the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, Congress
could simply strip the “real” Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdic-
tion, instead creating a lower court body comprised of the same Jus-
tices to hear these cases.179 This new body would have the power to
designate and assign temporary Justices, and not being the U.S. Su-
preme Court, would not need to comply with the One Supreme Court
Clause. While such a formalistic solution is not particularly desirable,
it serves to illustrate why a formalistic reading of the One Supreme
Clause does not comport with common sense.180 Therefore, since des-
ignation proposals would not run afoul of the plain language of the
One Supreme Court Clause and more formalistic readings cannot be
justified, these statutes, on their face, are likely to pose no constitu-
tional problem.
B. Circuit Judges and the Appointments Clause
Unique in the proposals to designate and assign circuit judges or
appeals court chief judges is the question of whether such a system
would violate the President’s Article II power to nominate Supreme
Court Justices. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
175. See id.
176. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 179.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 22.
180. See id. at 23.
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the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court.”181
Since the Appointments Clause gives exclusive power to the President
to nominate and the Senate to confirm Supreme Court Justices, the
objection would be that allowing circuit court judges to serve, even
temporarily, on the Supreme Court would impinge on the President’s
powers—since they were never officially nominated or confirmed for
that office.182
In considering this question, the basic rule is that Congress may
not add “new, fundamentally different duties to an existing office
without unlawfully seizing the appointment power for itself.”183 This
rule is based on the fundamental principle of separation of powers,
sometimes referred to in this context as self-aggrandizement by Con-
gress.184 If Congress were to fundamentally change the duties of an
existing office, that action would both create a new office and hand-
pick the officeholder.185 To take an obvious example, if Congress
changed the duties of the Ambassador to Luxembourg to include
hearing federal appellate cases on the D.C. Circuit, it would usurp the
President’s power to nominate federal judges. However, “minor
changes or additions [to an existing office]” do not necessitate reap-
pointment, so long as the new duties are within the scope of the cur-
rent office.186 For example, if Congress were to provide Federal
Communications Commission members with the power to regulate
network neutrality on the Internet, it would almost undoubtedly con-
form to the Appointments Clause, since regulating telecommunica-
tions services falls within the existing scope of their offices. Such a
change would only rise to a constitutional violation when the change
is so severe that it creates an entirely new office.
In Weiss v. United States—the leading case on this point—the Su-
preme Court considered a statute that provided new duties to commis-
sioned military officers that held bar memberships and had been
selected by the Judge Advocate General (“JAG”).187 Congress had
changed the duties of their offices to authorize them to serve as mili-
tary judges.188 The Court there applied a test of “germaneness,” com-
181. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
182. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 179.
183. Stras & Scott, supra note 36, at 457.
184. See id. at 495.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 496.
187. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166–96 (1994).
188. Id. at 175.
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paring their existing duties to the new ones provided by Congress.189
Officers already had the power to apprehend suspects, impose nonju-
dicial disciplinary punishments, and review court-martial sentences,
while the new duties only applied when “detailed” or “assigned” to
serve and still allowed officers to perform nonjudicial duties with the
permission of the JAG.190 Therefore, the Court decided that “the role
of military judge is ‘germane’ to that of military officer” and upheld
their constitutionality under the Appointments Clause.191 In effect,
the Court’s germaneness test was one of de facto reasonableness.192
Applied here, the addition of the statutory authority for circuit
court judges to sit by designation on the Supreme Court when neces-
sary seems to be squarely within the scope of their existing offices.
Circuit court judges are engaged in the act of judging; in fact, it is the
primary responsibility of their office. The proposal suggested here
would simply extend that existing duty to performing essentially the
same activity at a higher level and only in limited situations where an
existing Justice is recused. While it would be another circumstance
entirely if Congress suddenly transformed circuit court judges into Su-
preme Court Justices—as it would supplant, rather than minimally
supplement their existing duties—the addition of infrequent, limited
assignments to replace recused Justices would seem to be perfectly
germane to the purview of their offices.
Moreover, since every active circuit court judge would be eligible
for designation and assignment, there would be no need for the Presi-
dent to nominate particular individuals. The role of a temporary Jus-
tice would not be a new office but rather only a fleeting assignment,
ensuring that its creation would not encroach on the separation-of-
powers rationale underlying the Appointments Clause. After all, the
individuals within the pool of temporary replacements would be fed-
eral circuit court judges, who have already been nominated and con-
firmed to hold office as bonafide members of the Article III judiciary.
Although they have not been specifically appointed as Justices to the
Supreme Court, federal judges frequently serve temporarily by desig-
nation on other Article III courts to which they have not been nomi-
nated, and retired Supreme Court Justices even serve on other Article
189. Id. at 174–76.
190. Id. at 175–76.
191. Id. at 176.
192. Stephen G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Essay, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A
Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1403 (2006).
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III courts to which they were never nominated.193 Neither practice has
ever been deemed unconstitutional. In fact, in Nguyen v. United States,
although the Court invalidated a Ninth Circuit panel that included a
district judge for the Northern Mariana Islands (an Article IV territo-
rial court) who was serving by designation, the Court implicitly ac-
knowledged the validity of Article III judges serving by designation.194
This proposal would simply extend that practice to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Finally, with regard to the proposal to allow appeals court chief
judges to serve as temporary Supreme Court Justices, that scenario
raises a slightly more difficult case. Since chief judges represent a dis-
tinct class of all circuit judges—and are not currently appointed by
the President for that purpose—providing the power to sit tempora-
rily on the Supreme Court has more of a nexus to the principle of
guarding against self-aggrandizement by Congress. Yet ultimately the
question remains one of germaneness. So long as the new duties—
serving periodically on the Supreme Court in place of a recused Jus-
tice—are reasonably germane to the existing role of chief judge, the
change is constitutionally valid. While this may create a complex sce-
nario, since individuals for the role of chief judge—as opposed to ap-
peals court judge—are not nominated and confirmed under Article
II, the proposal ultimately calls for disposing of these issues by making
the new office subject to nomination and confirmation. Therefore,
there should be no Appointment Clause issue with either proposal.
C. Retired Justices and the Meaning of “Judicial Office”
There remains one final, lingering issue with regard to whether
retired Supreme Court Justices can legally serve by designation on the
Supreme Court. The question is whether a retired Justice, having for-
mally left the Court, is still constitutionally eligible to serve on the
same body to which she was originally appointed. This subtle distinc-
tion hinges on the meaning of judicial office in Article III and the
retirement statutes. The Constitution declares that Supreme Court
Justices “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”195 Yet to
some, it is unclear whether “offices” and “office” refer to the specific
office of Supreme Court Justice or judicial office generally. If they
193. See supra Part II.A (discussing the federal designation statutes).
194. See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 77–80 (2003).
195. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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only mean the former—and Supreme Court Justices remained Su-
preme Court Justices, even in retirement—then the President would
never be able to appoint a replacement Justice, since the number of
active Justices would never fall below the statutory cap of nine.196
Thankfully, this issue was resolved in Booth v. United States.197 Con-
sidering the question of whether senior judges remain in office under
Article III—and if their pay can be reduced—the Court construed the
term “office” broadly, concluding that a retired judge (or Justice) re-
tains the “office” for the purposes of pay, even when not hearing
cases.198 Booth, therefore, supports the proposition that “office” under
Article III means judicial office generally, not the specific position to
which a judge or Justice was appointed.199 In addition to barring Con-
gress from reducing the pay of senior judges, the Court also upheld
the practice of Justices riding circuit, deciding lower court cases by
way of their broad Article III powers of “judicial office.”200 Today, sim-
ilar practices are codified in the designation statutes that allow retired
Supreme Court Justices to serve on the lower courts—statutes that
have never been held unconstitutional.201 If retired Supreme Court
Justices can serve on lower courts and senior judges can serve on both
district and circuit courts, there would seem to be no constitutional
distinction in allowing retired Supreme Court Justices to serve on the
Supreme Court. Barring actual resignation or impeachment, even re-
tired Supreme Court Justices retain their status as members of the Ar-
ticle III judiciary.
Therefore, whether it be circuit court judges, appellate court
chief judges, or retired Supreme Court Justices, this Comment finds
no constitutional impediment that would block Congress from enact-
ing a law to allow them to serve on the Supreme Court by designation
and assignment. Of course, in one final irony, were this issue to actu-
ally arise before the U.S. Supreme Court, it would be the Justices of
the Court itself who would decide the issue—even though each Justice
would arguably have grounds to recuse on the basis of self-interest.202
196. See Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 19.
197. Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 346 (1934).
198. See Dorf & McElroy, supra note 10, at 19 n.93.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 294 (2006).
202. Ruthann Robson, Bring Back O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens?, CONST. L. PROF BLOG
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/08/bring-back-oconnor-
souter-and-stevens.html.
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Conclusion
Today, the U.S. Supreme Court stands at a crossroads—its image
frequently tarnished by partisan politics and allegations of bias, while
at the same time powerless to remedy even the most egregious appear-
ances of conflict of interest due to the lack of any method to replace
recused Justices. In a news culture dominated by “gotcha politics”—
from the attacks about Justice Thomas’s receipt of lavish gifts and Jus-
tice Scalia’s financial conflicts to demands that Justice Kagan recuse
herself on any hot-button issue in which the Obama administration
held a view—it is time for the Court to rebuild its tarnished reputa-
tion. That means taking ethics and recusal seriously.
It also means establishing a way to replace recused Justices. While
some may suggest that allowing circuit court judges to serve on the
Supreme Court, even in a single case for a single Justice, would under-
mine the Court’s legitimacy, the opposite seems far more likely. If the
Justices of the Supreme Court fail to recuse when necessary, the repu-
tation of the entire Court is damaged. But, if on the other hand, they
do recuse—and then deadlock 4-4 on a critical constitutional issue,
not only their reputation—but the rule of law itself—may be
damaged.
Congress should take the initiative and provide the Supreme
Court with the power to right its own ship by enacting a designation
statute. Having been battle-tested by most state supreme courts and
the entire federal judiciary, the time has come for replacement
Justices.
